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Reuschlein: Limited Partner Derivative Suits Symposium - Limited Partnership

LIMITED PARTNER DERIVATIVE SUITS
HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN"

Dean Reuschlein's articlegives a general discussion of the limited
partnershipform in contrast to the generalpartnershipand the corporation. He carefully reviews the historical development of these
different business organizationsand then analyzes the origins of the
revised Act's article 10 and the implications it holds for the limited
partnershipin the future. He urges adoption of the Act.
-Brockenbrough

Lamb, Jr.

Despite the ancient lineage of the limited partnership or an institution analogous thereto,' the limited partnership as we know it is
completely and entirely a creature of statute.2 When the Uniform
Partnership Act was in the drafting stage the proponents of treating
the partnership as an aggregate of persons rather than as a legal
* A.B., University of Iowa; J.D., Yale University; J.S.D. Cornell University. Katherine
Ryan Distinguished Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio,
Texas. Dean Emeritus, Villanova Law School.
The author gratefully acknowledges the research and drafting assistance of John E.
Banks, Jr., a third-year student at St. Mary's University School of Law.
1. The first known business form analogous to the limited partnership existed as early
as 1146 in the civil law countries. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PArrNERsIP § 26 (1968);
Comment, Regulation of Foreign Limited Partnerships,52 B.U.L. Rxv. 64 (1972); see Ames
v. Downing, 1 Bradf. Surr. 321, 329 (N.Y. 1850); 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
195 (1926); F. TROuRAT, THE LAW OF COMMENDATORY AND LIMITED PARTNERSHwS IN THE UNITED
STATES, at 11-112 (1853); Lobinger, The Natural History of the PrivateArtificial Person: A
Comparative Study in Corporate Origins, 13 TUL. L. REv. 41, 56 (1938). Known as the
"commends," this medieval limited partnership allowed one to invest in trading operations
and share in the profits without risking more than what was invested. 8 W. HOLDSWORTH,
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

195 n.6 (1926) (investor called commendator and the trader called

commendatarius).
This business form was codified in the civil law country of France in 1807. C. COM. arts.
23-29 (France 1807). It was called "societe en commandite." Id. Louisiana adopted the French
form into its civil law in 1808. La. Civ. Code art. 17 (1808); Comment, Partnershipin Commendam-Louisiana's Limited Partnership,35 TuL. L. Rv. 815 (1961). The current Louisiana partnership in commendam is found at LA. Cwv. CODE ANN. arts. 2839-51 (West 1952).
2. See Ames v. Downing, 1 Bradf. Surr. 321 (N.Y. 1850); Millard v. Newmark & Co.,
266 N.Y.S.2d 254 (App. Div. 1966); see Comment, The Limited Partnership, 45 YALE L.J.
895, 897 (1936). The first acts were adopted in New York (1822), Connecticut (1822) and
Pennsylvania (1936). See 3 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 36 (1884).
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entity carried the day.' When the Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
ULPA (1916), was being conceived, the same judicial premise applied.' This in and of itself serves tb explain the absence of a provision authorizing derivative suits by limited partners. Therefore the
new article 10 of the proposed ULPA (1976) presents an important
addition to the law of limited partnerships.5
BEFORE THE PROPOSED ARTICLE

10

As we are painfully aware from the debates during the period
when the Uniform Partnership Act was in the drafting stage, the
mighty locked horns over the merits of "entity" versus "aggregate"
as the fundamental theory upon which the Uniform Partnership Act
was to travel.' Despite the dominance of the aggregate theory of
partnership in the Uniform Partnership Act, entity notions nevertheless permeate the Partnership Act in a number of significant
areas.7 The absence of any provision for suits in the firm name, is
indicative of the preference for the aggregate theory. However, various statutes and procedural rules have largely rendered the omission innocuous.'
As indicated, the limited partnership is a creature of statute. The
3. Crane, The Uniform PartnershipAct-A Criticism, 28 HARv. L. REV. 762, 763 (1915);
Lewis, The Uniform PartnershipAct-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29 HARV. L. REV.
158, 191 (1916). See also Crane, Uniform PartnershipAct and Legal Persons,29 HARV. L. REV.
838 (1916); Note, The PartnershipAs a Legal Entity, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 698 (1941).
4. The Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
charged with drafting the UPA, served also as the committee to draft the ULPA. Lewis, The
Uniform Limited PartnershipAct, 65 U. PA. L. REv. 715 (1916).
5. The text of article 10 is set out, together with a discussion of its several provisions,
infra p. 522.
6. Dean James Barr Ames argued that the uniform act should treat the partnership as a
juristic entity, separate and distinct from the natural persons who might happen to be its
member partners. This approach, reasoned Ames, would make the legal concept of a partnership square with the commercial concept of a partnership. But when Dean William Draper
Lewis assumed the chief draftsman's duties, the new Partnership Act was irrevocably committed to proceed upon the classic common law theory that a partnership is not an entity
but an aggregation of persons bonded together contractually as members to carry on "as coowners a business for profit." UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6(1).
7. See id. § 8(3), 8(4) (dealing with conveyances and acquisition of title to property);
id. § 9(1) (recognizing the partner as an agent of the partnership). There are various procedural statutes permitting persons carrying the business as partners to sue or be sued in their
partnership name. See also UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 1, Commissioners' note
(1916) [hereinafter cited as ULPA (1916)].
8. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) and Tx. R. Civ. P. 28, all partnerships, both general and
limited, are capable of being sued in the firm name. Similar treatment is found in N.Y. Clv.
PRAc. ACT § 222a and PENN. R. Civ. P. 2128.
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need for an institution permitting a right to share in profits with
limited liability for losses has existed since the development of mercantile activity in Western Europe during the Middle Ages.' The
first limited partnership act was adopted by New York in 1822.10
Within the next thirty years the important commercial states had
followed New York's example." In 1916, the Uniform Limited Partnership Act was offered to the states. Today every state has enacted
a limited partnership statute.
The early limited partnership acts originated during a period
when there was reluctance to accept this new form, and the court,
therefore, construed the statute strictly as being in derogation of
common law.' Strict attention was paid to the statutory requisites
and any failure to meet these requisites would result in the limited
partner being stripped of his limited liability and treated instead as
a general partner. 3 This failure to meet the requirements included
any participation by the limited partner in the management of the
business, rendering the limited partner generally liable as a general
partner. I
It must be remembered that during this period corporate charters
were not easy to obtain and corporations were not of general commercial significance so that an analogy between the limited partners
and the stockholder was seldom employed. 5 In view of this, it is not
surprising to find fairly recent cases in a number of jurisdictions to
the effect that only a general partner could qualify as a proper party
9. See note 1 supra. During this period merchants were not held in high esteem and the
monied classes consisted for the most part of nobles and clergy who could not engage directly
in trade. Ames v. Downing, 1 Bradf. Surr. 321, 330 (N.Y. 1850); Comment, Partnershipin
Commendam-Louisiana's Limited Partnership, 35 TUL. L. REV. 815, 816-17 (1961). The
limited partnership form gave them the opportunity to secretly invest. in trading ventures and
collect huge profits without being personally liable and without being publically associated
with traders and merchants. This early form of limited partnership put to use great riches
not otherwise being used and caused tremendous growth of commerce which eventually raised
the stature of the merchant class. Id.
10. 1822 N.Y. Laws, ch. 244.
11. Lewis, The Uniform PartnershipAct, 65 U. PA. L. REv. 715, 720 (1916).
12. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 26, at 143 n.22 (1968).
13. See, e.g., Pierce v. Bryant, 87 Mass. (5 Allen) 91, 93 (1862); Fifth Ave. Bank v.
Colgate, 24 N.E. 799, 801 (N.Y. 1890); Richardson v. Hogg, 38 Pa. 153, 156 (1861); 56 MICH.
L. REv. 285, 286 (1957). Through time the courts came to treat the limited partner more
favorably so as to accomplish the purpose of the statute. White v. Eiseman, 134 N.Y. 101,
103, 31 N.E. 276, 277 (1892).
14. Millard v. Newmark & Co., 266 N.Y.S.2d 254, 259, 261 (1966); Executive Hotel
Assocs. v. Elm Hotel Corp., 245 N.Y.S.2d 929, 933 (Civ. Ct. 1964); ULPA § 7 (1916); see note
77 infra and accompanying text.

15. See H.

HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS
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to maintain a suit on behalf of or to defend an action against a
limited partnership. In Oil and Gas Ventures, Inc. v. Cheyenne Oil
Corp.'5 the Court of Chancery of Delaware, applying New Jersey law
held that: "[Ilt would appear that in a case of limited partnership
only a general partner is a proper party to a proceeding on behalf of
or against such a partnership unless the purpose of the suit is to
enforce a limited partner's right against or liability to the partnership." 7
The classic case permitting a limited partner to maintain a derivative suit is Klebanow v. New York Produce Exchange.'8 In
Klebanow the limited partnership of Ira Haupt & Co., a New York
brokerage house, had gone bankrupt. After finding that they were
unable to meet their financial obligations, the general partners entered into an agreement with their creditors and the New York
Stock Exchange, whereby they assigned to the latter all their rights
and powers over their assets. The assignees were to act as the receiver of Ira Haupt & Co. and accomplish the liquidation of the
limited partnership. The limited partners brought this suit alleging
violation of the Clayton Act," claiming that the liquidating partner
was unable, and because of a conflict of interest, his assigns were
unwilling to bring suit. The defendants contended that the plaintiffs
as limited partners had no standing to sue and no capacity to bring
suit. Their contention was supported by section 115 of the New York
Partnership Law which indicated that this cause of action would
belong to the general partners." The district court' and the court
16. 202 A.2d 282 (Del. Ch. 1964).
17. Id. at 284-85; accord, Vulcan Furniture Mfg. Corp. v. Vaughn, 168 So. 2d 760, 763
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Lieberman v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 385 P.2d 53, 56 (Wash. 1963);
ULPA § 26 (1916).
18. 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965), rev'g, 232 F. Supp. 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). Section 15 authorizes a suit by any person injured by anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws. Id. The court of appeals in Klebanow held that the partnership rather than the partner was the one injured. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344
F.2d 294, 296 (2d Cir. 1965).
20. At the time of this case, N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAw § 115 (McKinney 1948), as amended
by N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAw § 115 (McKinney Supp. 1976) was identical to ULPA § 26
(1916) which reads: "A contributor, unless he is a general partner, is not a proper party to
proceedings by or against a partnership, except where the object is to enforce a limited partner's right against or liability to the partnership." Id.
FED. R. Cir. P. 17(b) was held applicable and therefore New York law was controlling in
both the district court, Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 232 F. Supp. 965, 968
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), rev'd, 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965), and the court of appeals, Klebanow v.
New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1965).
21. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 232 F. Supp. 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), rev'd, 344
F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol9/iss3/4

4

Reuschlein: Limited Partner Derivative Suits Symposium - Limited Partnership

19781

ULPA-DERIVA TIVE SUITS

of appeals" held that this statute did not bar a limited partner from
bringing a derivative action.2s
The district court, however, held that a limited partnership is not
an entity and no action can be brought on its behalf.' This rationale
is questionable and was said to be in conflict with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 17(b) by the court of appeals. 5 The district court
analogized the position of a limited partner to that of a creditor
rather than that of an owner of the property of the limited partnership. 6 By analogy, therefore, the limited partner was barred from
bringing this suit because a creditor could not bring an action. This
reasoning flies in the teeth of the commissioners' statement in the
comment to section 1 of the ULPA (1916) which gives the limited
partner rights nearly equivalent to those of an owner." In Klebanow
the assignment of management was to the creditors and as long as
the limited partnership had sufficient assets to satisfy their claims,
those in control of the partnership, namely the creditors, had no
motive to prosecute a partnership claim. A creditor is only concerned with the payment of the debt owed to him, not the future
earnings of the firm."
In commenting on two New York cases ° allowing intervention by
limited partners in existing suits when it was claimed that the general partners were not protecting the partnership interests, the district court stated that the facts under consideration were so different
from those in the New York cases that the precedent was of doubtful
22. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965).
23. Id. at 298 (stated that this situation was not foreseen by legislature); Klebanow v.
New York Produce Exch., 232 F. Supp. 965, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), rev'd, 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir.
1965).
24. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 232 F. Supp. 965,968 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), rev'd,
344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965); see 50 IowA L. REv. 954, 956 (1965). It is not inconsistent with
either the nature of the limited partnership nor the purpose for which it was created to hold
that the limited partnership exists as a legal entity. The purpose of the limited partnership
is in fact advanced through a holding that the limited partnership is an entity by providing
additional protection for the investor. Id. at 957. "IT]he application of the entity theory by
the court in the instant case appears to be rather tenuous." Id. at 957.
25. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 299 (2d Cir. 1965).
26. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 232 F. Supp. 965, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), rev'd,
344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965).
27. Id. at 967.
28. The comment to ULPA § 1 (1916) refers to limited partners as "others who contribute
capital and acquire rights of ownership."
29. 50 IowA L. Rav. 954, 959 (1965).
30. Executive Hotel Assocs. v. Elm Hotel Corp., 245 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1964);
Cooper Prods. Co. v. Twin Bowl Co., 148 N.Y.L.J. 8 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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utility.3 ' Judge Tyler distinguished these cases on the ground that
they involved existing law suits and said that even if they are not
distinguishable they are not in accord with "significant provisions
of the New York Partnership Law as construed by the appellate
courts of this state."3 2 The cases, however, would seem to have involved sufficiently similar considerations to give the New York precedent some persuasive value. 3
Rather than allow the limited partners to sue derivatively, the
district court held that another remedy was available to the limited
partners in that they were entitled by law to a judicial dissolution
of the partnership.34 Judicial dissolution is not a satisfactory remedy
for the limited partner who is concerned with the future earnings of
the firm. In the Klebanow situation, therefore, judicial dissolution
of the partnership was an inadequate remedy, and the only remedy
likely to redress the injury to the limited partners was a derivative
action."
The court of appeals reversed the district court opinion and allowed the limited partners' derivative action. The court of appeals
reasoned that where there is a violation of the Clayton Act37 and the
business is conducted by a partnership, it is the partnership rather
than the partner who is the "person" injured.38 The court, as a
necessary step to holding that the partnership had the capacity to
31. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 232 F. Supp. 965, 968-69, (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
rev'd, 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965).
32. Id. at 969. To substantiate this statement of New York law the court only cited to
the Washington case of Lieberman v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 385 P.2d 53 (Wash. 1963).
33. 50 IOWA L. REv. 954, 959 (1965).
34. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 232 F. Supp. 965, 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (citing
N.Y. PARTNERSHiP LAW § 99 (McKinney 1948)), rev'd 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965), which is,
analogous to ULPA § 10(c) (1916)).
35. 50 IowA L. REv. 954, 959 (1965). An effort by the limited partners to compel the
general partners to bring the action would not have succeeded because the general partners
had assigned their interest to the defendants. The defendants, as assignees, would not have
brought the suit against themselves. "[Ilt is obvious that as long as the partnership has
sufficient capital to satisfy their [creditors'] claims, those in control of the partnership would
have no interest in prosecuting a partnership cause of action . . . . [Tlhe protection being
afforded the limited partners by those in control of the firm would be clearly inadequate."
Id. at 959.
36. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 299 (2d Cir. 1965), rev'g, 232
F. Supp. 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
38. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 296 (2d Cir. 1965). Section 15
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), authorizes a suit to be brought by "any person
who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws." Id.
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sue, implicitly held that the limited partnership was a legal entity.
The defendants claimed that the situation of the limited partner
was analogous to that of a creditor. This theory which was accepted
by the district court is based on the fact that both the creditor and
limited partner lack property rights, both are barred from using
their name in the firm title, and both have priority in the distribution of assets." But there are significant differences. The creditor
normally does not have a right to inspect the firm's books as he
wishes, as does the limited partner. 0 Also, the creditor has priority
over the limited partner in distribution of the assets." As noted
above, the comment to section 1 of the ULPA (1916) indicates that
the limited partner has some rights of ownership and does not view
his interest as that of a creditor."2
The partnership agreement of Ira Haupt & Co. set up a trust
relationship upon dissolution of the firm with the general partners
as trustees for the limited partners.'" The plaintiffs argued that the
assignment of the managing partners' duties to persons whose interests interfered with prosecution of the firm's claims would warrant
the plaintiff's derivative action as cestui que trust." It is well settled
that a cestui que trust may sue to enforce a claim on behalf of the
trust estate when the trustee has acted wrongfully. 5 The court denied the claim of express trust but found that a fiduciary duty in
favor of the limited partners had been created." The limited partners therefore, were analogous to the beneficiaries of a trust.', Using
this analogy, the court could find no logical reason why a beneficiary
should be allowed to sue yet under the circumstances deny this right
to a limited partner. 8
39. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1965).
40. Id. at 297.
41. Id. at 297.
42. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
43. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1965).
44. Id. at 297.
45. Id. at 297; Bonham v. Coe, 292 N.Y.S. 423 (App. Div.), aff'd mem., 12 N.E.2d 566
(N.Y. 1937); Brooklyn Free Kindergarten Soc'y v. Elbran Realty Corp., 7 N.Y.S.2d 531 (App.
Div. 1938); see Note, 35 FORDHAM L. REv. 731, 736 &nn. 46-48 (1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 282(2) (1959). "Upon improper refusal by a fiduciary, equitabie principles permit
the beneficiary to bring a derivative suit to protect his interest in the entity." Comment, 40
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1174, 1177 & n.22 (1965).
46. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1965).

47. Id. at 297. In the first suit allowing corporate shareholders to sue derivatively, the
directors were held to be trustees for the stockholders who were seen as beneficiaries. Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222, 232 (N.Y. 1832).
48. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1965).
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In the connected case of Klebanow v. Funston," a federal district
court said, "I have no difficulty with the proposition that the plaintiffs as limited partners have standing to sue derivatively and that
their position is analogous to that of a cestui que trust where the
trustee cannot or will not enforce the cause of action running to him
for the benefit of the cestui que trust."50 This was the sole basis used
by the court to sustain the limited partners' capacity to sue.
The trust theory has previously been applied to other business
situations.' It has from the beginning been a basis for allowing the
corporate shareholder to sue derivatively.2
More convincing is the analogy of the limited partner to the corporate shareholder. This analogy was quickly accepted by the New
York ProduceExchange court.53 Both the corporate shareholder and
the limited partner share in the profits, both are subordinated to the
general creditors, both have limited liability, and both exist solely
because of statutory authorization." The corporate shareholder has
some control over management through his vote. The limited partner also has some control over management with his power to veto
the admission of new partners, examine the books when he wishes,
and obtain full information on all matters affecting the partnership.55 The limited partnership like the corporation involves a separation of management from the investor. This separation offers
many opportunities for abuse. For these reasons American courts
have viewed the rights of the limited partner as analogous to those
of the corporate shareholder." In 1953, in the case of Ruzicka v.
Rager,57 the New York Court of Appeals held that the limited part8
ner was in a position analogous to that of a corporate shareholder.
49. 35 F.R.D. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
50. Id. at 520; see G. BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TuasTS, § 869, at 69-71 (2d ed. 1962); 2 A.
Scorr, TRusTS, § 282.1 (1st ed. 1939).
51. Comment, Standing of Limited Partners to Sue Derivatively, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
1463, 1480 (1965).

52. Id. at 1480.
53. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1965).
54. Id. at 297.
55. Id. at 297.
56. Id. at 297; Miller v. Schweickart, 405 F. Supp. 366, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (no more
than ordinary shareholders with a title); Ruzicka v. Rager, 111 N.E.2d 878, 881 (N.Y. 1953)

(quasi-shareholder status); Sweitzer v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 222 N.W.2d 662, 665
(Wis. 1974) (similarly analogous); Comment, Standing of Limited Partners to Sue
Derivatively, 65 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1463, 1478 (1965) (closely resemble); 50 IOWA L. REv. 954,
961 (1965) (position similar to that of the shareholder).
57. 111 N.E.2d 878, 881 (N.Y. 1953).

58. Id. at 881.
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In stating that the limited partner has limited liability, the court
referred to the "quasi-corporate aspects of a limited partnership and
the quasi-shareholder status of a limited partner."'"
In the corporate experience, when a breach of the fiduciary duty
brings intolerable results, the solution is the derivative action.60
This fiduciary duty is not lessened by a change in organizational
form of the firm. 6 There is likewise no need for different requirements to bring the derivative suit.
The court of appeals held that the limited partner's priority over
the general partner on dissolution does not necessitate a finding of
a creditor interest, but the limited partner's rights more closely
resemble those of a preferred stockholder whose right to sue derivatively has already been established." The limited partner is similar
to the preferred shareholder in that both have priority over the other
owners upon dissolution and both are subordinate to the general
creditor's rights." The court of appeals in the Klebanow case after
drawing the analogy of the limited partner to the preferred stockholder, said, "[i]ndeed, it makes considerably greater sense to
clothe the instant appellants with whatever descriptive phrase is
necessary to enable them to sue on behalf of the partnership than
to entertain derivative suits by persons owning a few shares in giant
corporations, especially if the shares are non-participating redeemable preferred."" It appears that the court of appeals felt that the
words used in section 115 of the New York Partnership Law must
be construed liberally. Judge Friendly quoted a United States Supreme Court case saying, "[iln reading the language we must remember that 'Legislative words are not inert, and derive vitality
from the obvious purposes at which they are aimed.""'
59. Id. at 881.
60. Comment, Standing of Limited Partners to Sue Derivatively, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
1463, 1479 (1965). In the same circumstances as the Klebanow case, corporate shareholders
would be permitted to bring a derivative suit on behalf of the entity "when the corporation
has refused upon proper demand to bring the suit or when such demand would be futile under
the circumstances." 50 IOWA L. Rav. 954, 960 (1965).
61. Miller v. Schweichart, 405 F. Supp. 366, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). "The form of the
enterprise does not diminish the duty of fair dealing by those in control of the investments."
Id. at 369.
62. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1965); see Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936); Comment, Standing of Limited Partners
to Sue Derivatively, 65 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1463, 1473, 1479 & n.110, 1480 (1965).
63. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1965).
64. Id. at 297-98.
65. Id. at 298 (quoting Grifliths v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 335, 355 (1939)). "In a situation
not covered by the statute, a court is authorized to apply general rules of law and equity."
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To grant relief by way of a derivative action, it is necessary for
the court to find that the limited partnership is an entity." Many
of the cases since Klebanow have allowed the limited partner to sue
derivatively. One case, Millard v. Newmark & Co.," decided soon
after Klebanow did not allow the limited partner to bring a derivative action."8 In the Millard case the limited partners brought an
action against the general partners for alleged misrepresentations
and fraud. The court conceded that the limited partnership was an
entity," but reasoned that since the limited partnership form did
not exist in common law and exists statutorily, the limited partner
has only those rights granted to him by statute or partnership agreement. 0 It was stated, "Only a general partner is authorized to act
in behalf of the partnership."' Although a limited partner has been
compared to a corporate shareholder, "the legislature has not seen
fit to endow him with the status of a shareholder, or to confer upon
him the rights, powers and obligations of a shareholder."" The court
said, "[Tihe legislature which created the limited partnership took
great care to enumerate the rights, privileges and benefits accruing
to a limited partner." 3 With this strict interpretation of the statute
the court held that neither the derivative suit nor the class action
should be allowed and that the proper remedy'is a direct action to
redress the individual wrong to each limited partner.' Each
"suffered a separate wrong and has a separate cause of action."7"
This interpretation would flood the courts with litigation.
The majority cited Executive Hotel Associates v. Elm Hotel
Corp.," to support the theory that a limited partner suing on behalf
Comment, 40 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1174, 1177 (1965). See ULPA § 29 (1916). Since shareholders
would be able to protect their investment through a derivative suit, a limited partner should
also be able to do so. 50 IOWA L. REv. 954, 961 (1965).
66. Comment, Standing of Limited Partners to Sue Derivatively, 65 COLUM. L. Rv.
1463, 1481 (1965). The author further notes that there are two distinct types of entities, an
artifical person created by statute and an entity recognized by the courts of equity. Id. at
1481. This latter approach has been used in the corporate sphere where the courts have
recognized the de facto corporate entity when the situation so warranted. Id. at 1481.
67. 266 N.Y.S.2d 254 (App. Div. 1966).
68. Id. at 259.
69. Id. at 259.
70. Id. at 259.
71. Id. at 259.
72. Id. at 259.
73. Id. at 260.
74. Id. at 260.
75. Id. at 260.
76. 245 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1964).
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of the corporation was exercising such control over the management
as to make himself a general partner with unlimited liability." This
would defeat the main purpose of the limited partnership, that of
encouraging investment. The choices available to the limited partner of meekly acquiescing in a general partner's misappropriation
of partnership funds, protecting his limited liability or bringing an
action on behalf of the limited partnership and subjecting himself
to unlimited liability is a Hobson's choice. "Certainly, no investor
can be said to have bargained for mismanagement of his firm. '" 8
The court in the Millard case dismissed briefly the Klebanow
opinion as being primarily a decision based on policy considerations." Instead the majority relied on Mannabergv. Herbst" to show
that "the wrong is done not to the firm but to each partner separately and that each not only may but must sue alone for such
damage as he has sustained."'"
Judge Rabin filed a strong dissent" in which he would have allowed the limited partners to "sue derivatively for the benefit of the
partnership where general partners have through wrongdoing, injured the partnership."" Judge Rabin noted that in Mannabergthe
plaintiffs were not seeking to maintain a derivative suit and that the
business form there involved was not a limited partnership. The
dissent also noted that the recent cases sustaining the right of a
limited partner to bring a derivative action were not troubled by
Mannaberg.8 5
77. Millard v. Newmark & Co., 266 N.Y.S.2d 254, 259, 261 (App. Div. 1966). Section 7

of the ULPA (1916) reads: "A limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner
unless, in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part
in the control of the business. ULPA § 7 (1916). The court in Executive Hotel Assocs. v. Elm
Hotel Corp., 245 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1964) (construing N.Y. PATNERSHIP LAw § 96
(McKinney 1948) which is identical to ULPA § 7), held that by bringing a suit on behalf of
the partnership, the limited partner had taken part in the control of the business and was
thus liable as a general partner. Id. at 933.
78. Comment, Standing of Limited Partners to Sue Derivatively, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
1463, 1479 (1965).
79. Millard v. Newmark & Co., 266 N.Y.S.2d 254, 262 (App. Div. 1966).
80. 45 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd without opinion, 47 N.Y.S.2d 100 (App. Div.), aff'd,
56 N.E.2d 255 (N.Y. 1944).
81. Millard v. Newmark & Co., 266 N.Y.S.2d 254, 262 (App. Div. 1966), quoting, Mannaberg v. Herbst, 45 N.Y.S.2d 197, 199 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
82. Millard v. Newmark & Co., 266 N.Y.S.2d 254, 262 (App. Div. 1966) (dissenting
opinion).
83. Id. at 263.
84. Id. at 264,
85. Id. at 264.
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After citing Ruzicka v. Rager,' Judge Rabin said, "Investment in
a business enterprise is not fully encouraged unless there be given
to the investor an adequate remedy to enable him to protect that
investment from wrongful acts which weaken the financial structure
that supports it."'8 "[Ulnless we allow the derivative suit, the limited partner has no adequate remedy.""
In Riviera Congress Associates v. Yassky" a limited partner was
allowed to sue derivatively." The court held that the plaintiffs were
"authorized to sue as limited partners on behalf of the partnership
entity to enforce a partnership claim when those in control of the
business wrongfully decline to do so."'
Section 115-(a) of the New York Partnership Law allows a limited
partner to bring an action "in the right of a limited partnership to
procure a judgment in its favor.'

2

The section requires that the

plaintiff be a limited partner "at the time of bringing the action,
and that he was such at the time of the transaction of which he
complains or that his status as substituted limited partner devolved
on him" by law or partnership agreement. 3 This requirement
clearly anticipates section 1002 of the revised ULPA. Like the revised Act, the New York law requires that the plaintiff "set forth
with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to secure the initiation
of such action by the general partner or partners, or the reasons for
not making such effort.""
In 1975, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in McCully v.
Radack5 held that limited partners could intervene in a foreclosure
proceeding if they could meet certain requirements." In this case
the limited partnership had purchased and operated a marina. The
limited partnership entered into a deed of trust agreement and later
defaulted. The trustees instituted foreclosure proceedings and the
marina was sold at an auction. The limited partners sued complaining that all assets were not included in the accounting and that an
86. 111 N.E.2d 878 (N.Y. 1953).
87. Millard v. Newmark & Co., 266 N.Y.S.2d 254, 267 (App. Div. 1966) (dissenting
opinion).
88. Id. at 264.
89. 277 N.Y.S.2d 386, 223 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 1966).
90. Id. at 391, 223 N.E.2d at 879.
91. Id. at 391, 223 N.E.2d at 879.
92. N.Y. PARTNERsmp LAw § 115-a(1) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
93. Id. § 115-a(2).
94. Id. § 115-a(3).
95. 340 A.2d 374 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975).
96. Id. at 380.
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allegedly exorbitant legal fee had been charged against the partnership assets. The Maryland court held that "limited partners may
intervene in a commercial transaction, such as a deed of trust foreclosure, when there are strong allegations and proof that the third
party has wrongfully acted in concert and collusion with the general
partner to the detriment of the limited partnership."' 7 The court
allowed the plaintiffs to intervene in a commercial transaction
which would normally be under the exclusive domain of the general
partners as managers. Whether to allow a deed of trust foreclosure
or not is normally a decision for the management, and the courts
historically have been hesitant about interfering with the internal
affairs of a business entity." While a refusal to bring an action on a
claim benefiting the firm is a clear breach of a fiduciary duty, the
commercial transaction here may not clearly be a breach of trust.
Enough has been said to indicate that enlightened courts have felt
it quite necessary to permit a limited partner, in an appropriate
situation, to bring a derivative action, either under state statutes
anticipating article 10 of the revised ULPA or without benefit of
statutory authorization of any kind. They have rationalized such
action by drawing an analogy between a limited partner and a
stockholder in a corporation-or drawing upon the less convincing
analogies between cestui que trust and the limited partner or between a creditor and the limited partner.
ARTICLE 10

Article 10 of the revised Act brings the treatment of limited partners into the realm of commercial reality. It is a recognition of the
enlightened position which the better reasoned cases had already

97. Id. at 380.
98. In the early corporate derivative suit of Foss v. Harbottle, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch.
1843), the Chancellor limited this new form by requiring that the injury be one that could
not be redressed by the shareholders themselves. The judiciary sought to balance the minority
stockholder's lack of remedy with the policy of having the corporation resolve its own disputes. Id. at 202-05.
Another factor was the court's desire not to open the floodgates of litigation to any
stockholder with a grievance. See Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on Its
Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980 (1957). Prunty also suggests that a shareholder may be
able to circumvent the defense that the grievance is one which can be settled within the
corporation on the theory that the injurious action of the directors was ultra vires. This is
due to the fact that the majority cannot authorize or ratify an act beyond the grant of
authority of the organization. Id. at 984. -
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embraced-regarding the limited partner as essentially an investor
analogous to the stockholder in a corporation. The article is divided
into four sections.
Section 1001 authorizes a derivative action by the limited partner
whenever the general partners refuse to bring suit or a successful
attempt to have them sue is unlikely. This is analogous to the provision of rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that allows
a derivative action to be brought by "one or more shareholder or
members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated
association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce
a right which may properly be asserted by it."" Thus article 10, like
rule 23.1 recognizes the derivative nature of the action. It is interesting to note that rule 23.1 alone is broad enough in scope, permitting
the derivative suit to be brought not only by members of a corporation but also by members of an "unincorporated association," which
term includes a limited partnership.
Section 1002 of the revised Act states that:
In a derivative action, the plaintiff must be a partner at the time of
bringing the action and (1) at the time of the transaction of which
he complains or (2) his status as a partner had devolved upon him
by operation of law or pursuant to the terms of the partnership agreement from a person who was a partner at the time of the transaction.
Here again it is interesting to note the "proper plaintiff" provisions of rule 23.1 which prescribes that "the complaint shall be
verified and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or
member at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that
his share or membership thereafter devolved on him by operation
of law." Again it is to be noted that rule 23.1 is not limited to
shareholder plaintiffs but deals with "member" plaintiffs (such as
limited partners) as well. Rule 23.1 also requires that the complaint
allege "(2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction
on a court of the United States which it would not otherwise have."
This directive would, of course, be applicable when the limited partner brings his action in a federal court.
Section 1003 requires that "the complaint shall set forth with
particularity the effort of the plaintiff to secure initiation of the
action by a general partner or the reasons for not making the effort."
This section is strikingly similar to the pleading requirements of rule
23.1 which recites that "[t]he complaint shall also allege with par99. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
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ticularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the
action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if
necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for
his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort." Here
too it is clear that rule 23.1 in its pleading provisions encompasses
not only shareholders in a corporation but "members" of an association, such as a limited partnership.
Section 1004 requires that:
If a derivative action is successful, in whole or in part, or if anything
is received by the plaintiff as a result of a judgment, compromise or
settlement of an action or claim, the court may award the plaintiff
reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, and shall'
direct him to remit to the limited partnership the remainder of those
proceeds received by him.
This section emphasizes what has long been recognized doctrine
with respect to shareholders derivative actions, i.e. that the suit be
one to redress a wrong to the corporation, the results of a judgment
in favor of the plaintiff belong to the corporation. Section 1004 recognizes that the derivative suit brought by a limited partner is
brought in the right of the partnership and the fruits of recovery
belong to the limited partnership. To this section 1004 adds the
obviously equitable award of reasonable expenses including counsel
fees to the limited partner plaintiff.

AFTERGLOW

If the revised ULPA, including its article 10, is adopted, hopefully
in all of the fifty states, it will lay to rest the matter of the limited
partner's right to sue derivatively on behalf of the limited partnership. Further, it will instantiate the salutory solutions reached by
the better reasoned decisions antedating proposed article 10 or the
law of each adopting jurisdiction. In so doing the adoption of the
revised statute will bring the law governing limited partnerships
into conformity with the views of the commercial world, which has
long viewed the limited partnership as an entity and the limited
partner primarily as an investor analogous to the shareholder in a
corporation.
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